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With the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the EU being increasingly 
questioned and the Prime Minister, David Cameron, committed to 're-negotiate’ the 
terms of membership, consideration is being given to what forms alternatives to [full] 
membership may take. While much current discussion focuses on the advantages and 
disadvantages of particular existing arrangements (e.g. European Economic Area, Swiss 
bilateralism), this paper examines the broader principles and practices that have to date 
underpinned – and undermined – EU’s attempts to develop alternatives to [full] EU 
membership. Drawing on an analysis of the evolution of association as an alternative to 
membership, the paper assesses the principled, practical and political limitations the EU 
faces – and imposes on itself – in offering an acceptable balance of rights and 
obligations to states not wishing to assume the mantle of full membership. In its 
assessment the paper considers various proposed models of affiliate and associate 
membership. It also situates consideration of the UK case in the broader context of the 
EU’s relations with other European non-member states for which membership may not 
be achievable and for which alternatives to membership (e.g. a form of privileged 
partnership) have been proposed. In doing so, the paper reflects on the precedent-
setting consequences of any arrangement that the EU might reach with any state re-
negotiating membership or withdrawing. 
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Domestic questioning of the merits of the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European 
Union (EU) has long been a feature of UK politics, manifesting itself in the ‘no’ campaign in the 1975 
referendum, the Labour Party’s policy of withdrawal in the 1983, backbench rebellions during the 
Prime Ministership of John Major, and the rise of extra-parliamentary parties such as the 
Referendum Party in the 1990s and more recently the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). 
Rarely has the questioning been as intense as it is today, 40 years after the United Kingdom acceded 
to the European Communities in 1973. Various shades of euroscepticism dominate a domestic 
political debate that is currently focused on a Conservative Prime Minister’s commitment to re-
negotiate the terms of UK membership and hold an in-out referendum during 2017 assuming the 
Conservative Party return to government following the next general election in 2015. With 
withdrawal from the EU advocated by Conservative Party members of the government and a 
unprecedentedly large and vociferous number of Conservative Party backbench MPs the debate is as 
much about the whether to leave the EU and what sort of options exist for life outside the EU as it is 
about what the foci should be of Cameron’s desired ‘new settlement’ to be negotiated after 2015. In 
the midst of the views being offered around these questions, the clamour for an ‘EU referendum’ 
has become so pervasive that a popular vote – whether on a continued membership, withdrawal or 
a new settlement – appears to be a political certainty. Such is the perceived popular support for a 
referendum – bolstered by opinion polls indicating increased dissatisfaction with EU membership – 
no political party can afford to be seen to oppose a referendum even if policy as yet is no explicitly in 
favours of putting continued membership to the vote.  
 
While there can be no certainty that a future UK government will either seek to negotiate or achieve 
a new settlement or that a referendum will produce a vote either for the new arrangement or to 
leave the EU, the current tenor of the UK debate demands serious reflection on what alternatives to 
the status quo either exist or might be developed. The history of the EU relations with European 
non-members states has witnessed the establishment of various forms of association with differing 
levels of cooperation and integration. At a basic level, there have been the associations based on 
industrial free trade established through the Europe Agreements with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (now all EU members) and the Stabilization and Association Agreements with the 
countries of the Western Balkans. Similar associations based on ‘deep and comprehensive free trade 
areas’ are due to be established with the eastern European neighbours (in particular Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia) as part of the Eastern Partnership. A more advanced form of association is 
that based on a customs union that has been established between the EU and Turkey. The most 
advanced form of association to date is the European Economic Area based on a dynamic and 
homogenous extension of the Single Market’s free movement of goods, services, capital and 
workers to three of the four members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. The intensity of this particular form of association – which in part is less 
intense than Turkey’s association in that it does not involve a customs union and therefore the 
adoption of the EU’ common external tariff and alignment with the EU’s common commercial policy 
– is also reflected in the membership of the three EFTA-EEA states of Schengen. A similar level of 
integration has also been established with Switzerland, albeit on less dynamic basis, through a range 
of bilateral agreements. 
 
Among advocates of UK withdrawal, the EEA and the Switzerland’s bilateral relationship are often 
presented as preferred alternatives to membership. The Bruges Group has advocated following the 
Norwegian example and the EFTA-EEA option (van Randwyck, 2011). UKIP is less enthusiastic about 
the EEA, seeing it more as a temporary staging post from which to negotiate a more advantageous 
bilateral deal. It tends to be more sympathetic to a tailored arrangement following the Swiss 
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example (UKIP, 2011). For hard-line Conservative Party eurosceptics, both the EEA and have their 
attractions.  For Cameron, who insists on his personal preference from remaining in the EU, neither 
is desirable. In announcing his commitment to a ‘new settlement’ and a referendum, he implicitly 
rejected both the Norwegian and Swiss options (Cameron, 2013). The influential eurosceptic think 
tank, Open Europe, adopts a similar position arguing that, from a trade perspective at least, neither 
option – nor the option of a customs-union based association similar to Turkey’s – constitutes an off-
the-peg model that the UK could adopt (Open Europe, 2012). The preference, shared by Cameron, is 
for a new form of membership. 
 
Although none of the existing forms of association is the preferred option of either the Conservative 
Party, its coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, or the opposition Labour Party – or indeed any of 
the other political parties with MPs – analysis of the options for any ‘new settlement’ for UK 
membership of the EU should not lose sight of the existing relationships that the EU has created with 
European non-member states. This is for three reasons. First, a UK referendum on continued 
membership could lead to withdrawal in which case an alternative relationship would have to be 
found. Existing associations would provide options and models. Second, the nature and content of 
existing associations provide valuable insights into the principles and practices that underpin the 
forms of integration which the EU is willing to establish. This is important since there is an implicit 
and misplaced assumption in much of the rhetoric surrounding the desired ‘new settlement’ – as 
well as on the nature of any post-withdrawal settlement negotiated under Article 50 TEU– that the 
negotiation could accommodate a whole range of UK preferences. As any representative of a 
European state that has negotiated an advanced form of integration with the EU will be testify, there 
are limits to the negotiating flexibility of the EU. Principles, practices and precedents cast their 
shadows. Third, the associations will themselves cast a shadow over any negotiation, for whatever 
new settlement the UK secures – within or with the EU – it will set a precedent for what non- 
members involved in associations can legitimately claim from and expect of the EU.  
 
Similarly, any new settlement will set precedents for existing and future members of the EU. In any 
negotiation with a future UK government on changing the nature, form and substance of UK 
membership, the United Kingdom’s EU partners will be mindful of the practical and reputational 
implications for the evolving EU. It will also be conscious of the expectations – and opportunities –
that any new form of membership might create for other current or would-be members. If ideas 
such as partial, affiliate, associate or limited membership are realised, they will set precedents. 
 
Drawing on an analysis of the evolution of association as an alternative to membership, the paper 
assesses the principled, practical and political limitations the EU faces – and imposes on itself – in 
offering an acceptable balance of rights and obligations to states not wishing to assume the mantle 
of full membership.  
 
Principles and Practice in Associate Status 
 
Throughout is existence the EU has demanded that acceding states subscribe to the full range of 
membership obligations contained in its constitutive treaties. Furthermore, acceding states would 
(eventually) have to take on the entire acquis communautaire. For early entrants, derogations and 
transition periods meant that adoption and implementation of the full acquis might not take place 
until some years into membership. More recently, with the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements the 
emphasis has been on almost full adoption and implementation of the acquis no later than accession 
and increasingly in most instances well before accession takes place. Only once inside the EU, and 
during the course of subsequent treaty reform negotiations, have member states been able to 
secure opt outs. Significantly, these opt outs have been from new treaty provisions, not existing 
commitments. They also remain very much the exception not the rule. Consequently they are 
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limited in number and affect only a small number of member states, primarily Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom.1  
 
This principled approach to the terms of accession is matched by a broadly consistent and 
demanding approach to associate status. This follows in part from the treaty provisions on 
association, which have in essence remain unchanged since they were inserted into the Treaties of 
Rome in 1957. Then, Article 238 TEEC stated that ‘The Community may conclude with a third State, a 
union of States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures’. Following some textual 
adjustments and a renumbering, Article 217 TFEU states that: ‘‘The Union may conclude with one or 
more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.2  
 
In developing an understanding of  
 
In contrast to many other areas of EEC activity, the Six were forced to deal with the question of 
association even before the Treaty of Rome entered into force. The Maudling negotiations on the 
creation of a European free trade area were already under way. Consequently, as Henig notes, there 
was a need to respond rapidly to external stimuli rather than proceed on the basis of an “a priori 
rationally conceived doctrine”.3 However, what emerges from the early years of the EEC is not a 
coherent policy per se. Rather, reports and communications highlight minimum elements of an 
association while emphasising the flexibility of the concept. Moreover, the fact that unanimity was 
required for the conclusion of association agreements allowed the actual use of Article 238 to be 
determined by one member state. Also, there was a clear desire on the part of the EEC to ensure 
that priority was given to its development. Hence, a reluctance to define association and lay down a 
policy meant that the creation of associations with European countries would be as much 
subordinated to the position of individual member states and the internal dynamics of the EEC as to 
desire for establishing close ties with non-member states.  
 
2.2.1 The Interim Committee 
 
The first steps towards the formulation of a policy on association were taken by the Interim 
Committee set up in 1957 to co-ordinate the position of the Six in international organizations.4. 
During its first meeting in October 1957, the Committee made clear that an association established 
under Article 238 could not be based simply on a free trade area involving the elimination of 
customs duties and quotas. Any agreement would have to involve further real integration, such as 
the co-ordination or harmonization of competition policies and the conditions of production, and 
                                                          
1  And of these, Ireland has only reluctantly opted out of arrangements relating to the free movement of people and 
justice and home affairs cooperation because of the position adopted by the United Kingdom and its Dublin’s 
preference to maintain the Common Travel Area arrangements that significantly reduce border controls on movements 
between the two states. 
2  The adjustment from ‘a third State, a union of States or’ to ‘one or more third countries or’ was introduced by the TEU. 
The dropping of the ‘s’ from ‘procedures’ is not recorded, but appears in the consolidated versions of the TEC and TFEU 
produced since the Treaty of Amsterdam. The plural has been retained in the French (and German) language versions 
of the consolidated TEC and TFEU. 
3 Henig (1971a), p. 6. See also Benoit’s comment that there was a “lack of sufficiently clear and courageous plans in the 
Community either for facilitating access to the Community of those other European states that has significant 
difficulties to overcome in joining or for providing a solid basis of reassurances that no serious difficulties would be 
created for those who chose to stay out.”  See Benoit, Emile (1961), Europe at Sixes and Seven - The Common Market, 
The Free Trade Association and the United States, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 247. See also Weil (1970), p. 
65. 
4 Lindberg (1963), p. 141; Groeben, Hans von der (1982), Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft - Das Ringen um 
den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 64-70.  
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deal with the problems of agricultural trade.5  A more restrictive interpretation emerged in the so-
called Okrent Report produced in October 1958. Accordingly, all associates would have to accept the 
validity of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome with regard to the principles of international trade, 
(paragraph 2). In addition, any association agreement with the OEEC “must not in any way prejudice 
either the content or the implementation of the Treaty of Rome”.6 The sanctity of the Community’s 
treaty base and the determination of the Six not to compromise the decisions they had taken in 
agreeing to create the EEC were evident. Furthermore, all associates would have to accept the EEC 
as an evolving entity, and not expect to be able to restrict it in its evolution. Such views reflected 
those already expressed by Hallstein in his speech to the EP in March 1958. Here, he argued the 
association of other European states with the EEC should not compromise the level of integration 
reached by the Six.7 
 As regards the proposed content of an association – and Okrent was assuming a multilateral 
association with the OEEC -  Okrent made it clear that any agreement must involve more than just 
the establishment of a free trade area. Its proposals envisaged the co-ordination of trade policies, 
measures designed to minimize the distortion of competition as resulting from privileged access to 
third markets, the pragmatic convergence of economic and financial policies, the adoption of rules 
governing competition, the harmonization of social conditions, the approximation of legislation, and 
the free movement of workers.8 In addition the report suggested the inclusion in an agreement of 
various escape clauses and the establishment of institutions “analogous to those already existing in 
the O.E.E.C.”.9 Clearly, the Six were united in seeing association involving more than just free trade 
in industrial goods. As to the content of association, Okrent clearly showed that, from the outset, the 
Six envisaged association stretching beyond a simple free trade agreement and involving genuine 
integration.10  
 
2.2.3 The Commission’s First Memorandum 
 
Despite the collapse of the Maudling negotiations in November 1958, the Council expressed its 
desire to “continue the efforts to establish a multilateral association” and called on the Commission 
to formulate a common position on association which would be acceptable to the member states.11 
The Commission’s report, known as the First Memorandum, was presented to the Council on 26 
                                                          
5 Lindberg (1963), pp. 141-142. 
6 Okrent (1958), paragraph 2. Support for such a principle was already well established within the Community. 
7 See EEC Commission (1958), points 147 and 154; Bauer Gérard F. (1963), “Europäische Integration und neutrale 
Staaten”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik, Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4, pp. 154, note 30; Hollenweger (1967), p. 145. 
8 Okrent (1958), paragraphs 5-24 and paragraph 39. 
9 Okrent (1958), paragraphs 27-33. The OEEC institutional framework consisted of a Council, meeting at either 
ministerial level or at the level of permanent representatives, assisted by a Secretariat, and several Boards responsible 
for giving considered opinion and taking decisions where specifically instructed to do so. The Report suggested that the 
Commission be represented in the Council, and that a Court of Justice might be necessary. Decisions within the Council 
with the Community acting as a unit, should initially be taken on the basis of unanimity, although provision for majority 
decisions might be considered at a later date. 
10 The Commission, in its First General Report, written prior to the collapse of the Maudling negotiations, adopted a 
similar line to Okrent. It argued in favour of “a certain harmonization of the external tariffs or ... the establishment of 
countervailing duties”; “special provisions” for the UK’s system of Commonwealth preferences; “a solution which 
includes agriculture”, albeit not a common agricultural policy; the principle, on institutional matters, “that the proper 
functioning of the Common market must not be weakened or impeded by a looser association”. See EEC Commission 
(1958), points 156-159. 
11 Cited in Camps (1964), p. 184. Although the Commission was only set up mid-way through the free trade area talks 
and, as a result, only played a minor secondary role in formulating the position of the Six, this did not mean that it 
remained silent for the duration of the negotiations or that it did not wish to develop a role for itself in the process. On 
several occasions, the Commission made its own views clear, arguing strongly that an agreement with the OEEC should 
in no way prejudice the future development of the newly created Community. See Lindberg (1963), pp. 143-146. 
 6 
February 1959.12 In what Duchêne describes as a “bold ... far-sighted ... and shrewd” approach,13 
and Henig as “an amalgam of pious hope and mere verbiage”,14 the memorandum reiterated 
Commission doubts about the possibility of reaching an agreement on a European free trade area 
given the heterogeneity of the seventeen OEEC states and their various interests.15 Instead, a policy 
should be developed to deal with non-members as a whole.16 Nevertheless, the memorandum 
recognized the importance of trade within Europe and the need to work towards establishing a 
European Economic Association.17 However, this could only be achieved if an effective competition 
policy were adopted; provisions made for the free movement of workers, the liberalization of 
services and greater agricultural trade; policies relating to economic trends co-ordinated; an active 
development policy pursued; and distortions in competition resulting from differences in external 
tariff and trade policies kept to a minimum.18 Moreover, all this would have to be placed within a 
world context and be carried out within international organizations. 
 Although these preconditions for a multilateral association clearly exceeded those which the 
remaining members of the OEEC were willing to accept, the memorandum made it clear that the EEC 
was prepared to enter into bilateral or multilateral negotiations, not necessarily within the OEEC 
framework, towards either membership or association.19 On the actual question of association, the 
Commission outlined in the memorandum what it saw as the possibilities for such a relationship:  
Association does not create such close links [as membership]. The essential advantage of 
this system is its great flexibility. Firstly, it allows for both multilateral and bilateral 
association. Secondly, it allows for all solutions: those which adopt only certain provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome, and those which take over that instrument almost in its entirety. 
Furthermore, the system makes it easier both for the country applying for association and 
for the Community to draft special clauses exactly adapted to the situation of the country 
in question and to the relations which it already has with the Community. Finally - and this 
is perhaps the essential difference - the associate country retains its full individuality on 
the political plane. The pledges which such a country would give in return for certain 
facilities, like any other commitment to which it subscribed, would be of a contractual 
nature and it would put them into operation by its own independent action.20 
 
 Although this view of association, highlighting its flexibility, may appear to have held out the 
opportunity of a simpler arrangement than that which the EEC was proposing for the OEEC as a 
whole, the conditions laid down for the European Economic Association should not be ignored. Even 
if a European country were to have taken up the offer to bring Article 238 into play, a simple free 
                                                          
12 EEC Commission (1959a), First Memorandum of the Commission of the European Community to the Council of 
Ministers of the Community (pursuant to the decision of 3 December 1958), concerning the problems raised by the 
establishment of a European Economic Association, Brussels, 26 February. For a discussion of the Memorandum, see 
Camps, Miriam (1960), Division in Europe, PEP Occasional Paper No. 8, London, pp. 13-16; Bauer (1963), pp. 155-156; 
Jesserich (1963), pp. 40-45; Lindberg (1963), pp. 146-151; Camps (1964), pp. 184-188; Henig (1971a), pp. 26-28. 
13 Duchêne (1994), pp. 321-322. 
14 Henig (1971a), p. 27. 
15 EEC Commission (1959a), point. 5. 
16 EEC Commission (1959a), points. 16-17. 
17 EEC Commission (1959a), points 62-70. 
18 EEC Commission (1959a), point 33. 
19 “Any European countries already anxious to go further in economic integration and to benefit more rapidly from its 
[the Community’s] machinery are free to bring into play Articles 237 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome”, EEC Commission 
(1959a), point 85. It is the view of Yardas (1966), pp. 34-35, that the EEC here was hoping “to win other countries to 
the EEC form of integration and thereby to prevent the formation of E.F.T.A.”. Groeben (1982), p. 67 maintains, 
however, that de Gaulle had no desire to see an EEC-UK association established for fear that this could prevent France 
using the Community as the basis for French-led political cooperation in Europe. 
20 EEC Commission (1959a), point 87 (emphasis added).  
 7 
trade area solution would have been unacceptable to the EEC. Some form of genuine integration 
would have had to have taken place. 
 Within the Council, reactions to the memorandum were mixed and generally inconclusive. 
While the French welcomed the Commission’s arguments, the other five member states tended to 
regard the memorandum’s conclusions as too negative.21 Indeed, Camps argues that there was 
“considerable annoyance” with the Commission for failing to define the basis for negotiations within 
the other OEEC states as required in its mandate.22 As a result, it simply “took note” of the 
memorandum, reaffirmed its desire to see a multilateral OEEC-EEC arrangement established, and 
instructed a special committee, comprising representatives of the member states and the 
Commission, to study the memorandum and report back.23 The Special Committee, chaired by 
Commissioner Rey, met in April, May and June 1959 against a background of increasing French 
opposition to a Europe-wide free trade area.24 However, before the Committee had produced any 
findings, the Commission embarked on a new initiative.  
 
2.2.4 The Commission’s Second Memorandum  
 
On 22 September 1959 the Commission presented a Second Memorandum to the Special 
Committee.25 This reiterated the main arguments of the First Memorandum and acknowledged that 
the failure to reach unanimous agreement within the EEC on how to resolve the problem of relations 
with the OEEC was causing a sense of uncertainty in industrial and commercial circles. In response, it 
proposed pursuing solutions to the problem of European trade within a more global context in 
GATT, dealing with specifically European problems through special “contact” committees, and 
promoting a concerted policy towards underdeveloped countries thorough regular consultations 
with the United Kingdom and the United States.26 Thus, in line with French thinking and with the 
apparent encouragement of the United States, the Commission was effectively advocating 
abandonment of a purely European trade arrangement.27 Although the Commission was at pains to 
                                                          
21 Lindberg (1963), pp. 151-152; Henig (1971a), p. 17. See also Luif (1986), p. 9. 
22 Camps (1960), p. 15; Camps (1964), p. 188. 
23 “Resolution of the Council of the EEC, 19 March 1959”, cited in EEC Commission (1959a), p. 42. See also Lindberg 
(1963), p. 152. Indeed, as Camps (1964), p. 189 argues, the fact that the committee included representative of the 
members states was “a sign of the general dissatisfaction” with the First Memorandum. 
24 Lindberg (1963), pp. 153-154. 
25 EEC Commission (1959b), Memorandum from the Commission to the Special Committee for the Study of problems 
concerning a European Economic Association, I/COM(59)123 rev, Brussels, 22 September. For a discussion of the 
Memorandum and the circumstances in which it was produced, see Camps (1960), pp. 17-25; Lindberg (1963), pp. 154-
156; Camps (1964), pp. 197-199. 
26 EEC Commission (1959b), p. 2 and p. 7. 
27 Indeed, Henig (1971a), p. 28 argues that the Second Memorandum contained a “straightforward assertion that the 
immediate formation of any kind of European Economic Association was impossible”. The shift in emphasis towards a 
global solution to the problems of trade and also the praise the memorandum bestowed on the US is seen by Beugel as 
evidence that both the memoranda were written “for American eyes”, the Commission recognising in US and French 
support “an alliance for victory”. See Beugel, E.H. van der (1966), From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European 
Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 341-342. Camps (1960), pp. 18-20 
provides five reasons for the hardening of the Commission’s position against a European association, concluding that in 
drafting the Memorandum it had the impact on the United States “very much in mind”. The reasons advanced were: 
the need to prioritize making the EEC irreversible; the belief that free trade only makes economic sense as part of an 
economic union; the evidence in the Stockholm Plan for a European Free Trade Area that the Seven were only willing 
to negotiate in terms of a free trade area; the concomitant that UK enthusiasm for an arrangement with the EEC was 
waning; and the worsening US balance of payments position. See also Camps (1964), pp. 192-197. By contrast, with 
regard to EFTA, the EP’s Committee on Commercial Policy believed that the Stockholm Convention could improve the 
chances for creating a European Economic Association. See Martino, Gaetano (Rapporteur) (1960), “Rapport à 
l’Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l’Europe sur l’activité de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne du 1er janvier 
1959 au 1er mars 1960”, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne - Documents de Séance, No. 26, 14 June, point 72. For 
an economic assessment arguing that the creation of EFTA “would probably lessen rather than weaken the feasibility of 
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invoke a liberal trade policy for the EEC, it was becoming increasingly clear that prospects for a 
European trade arrangement were becoming dimmer.28 
 Reaction to the Second Memorandum was mixed with Germany and the Benelux countries 
clearly retaining their enthusiasm for a European free trade arrangement against French and 
Commission opposition. All the same, and in the knowledge that the United States endorsed the 
Commission’s approach, the Council accepted the Memorandum’s main points in November 1959.29 
While a contact committee involving the EEC and representatives of the Seven was subsequently 
established, it was clear from the memoranda that relations with the rest of Europe were losing their 
prominence on the EEC’s political agenda.30 Confirmation of this had already come in October 1959 
when the Six agreed to accelerate the timetable for integration within the EEC. Evidently, the 
chances that Article 238 would be used as the basis for close ties with other European states were 
fading rapidly. 
 
The Birkelbach Report 
 
The first significant statement on what form or forms an association could take came from the 
Commission in a ‘First Memorandum’ presented to the Council on 26 February 1959. 
Association does not create such close links [as membership]. The essential advantage of 
this system is its great flexibility. Firstly, it allows for both multilateral and bilateral 
association. Secondly, it allows for all solutions: those which adopt only certain provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome, and those which take over that instrument almost in its entirety. 
Furthermore, the system makes it easier both for the country applying for association and 
for the Community to draft special clauses exactly adapted to the situation of the country 
in question and to the relations which it already has with the Community. Finally - and this 
is perhaps the essential difference - the associate country retains its full individuality on 
the political plane. The pledges which such a country would give in return for certain 
facilities, like any other commitment to which it subscribed, would be of a contractual 
nature and it would put them into operation by its own independent action (Commission 
of the European Economic Community, 1959: 87). 
 
 
contribution from within the EEC to thinking on the terms of association came in 1961 with the 
drawing up of the Birkelbach report by the Political Committee of the European Parliament. 
Although the EP at this point was not a key EEC institution and the report was not an official 
statement of policy, it was generally welcomed within the Commission and certainly not rejected by 
any of the member states. The Commission President, Walter Hallstein, indicated that he was in 
almost total agreement with its content (Nemschak, 1963), despite the restrictive nature of its 
findings.  Henig (1971: 37-38) suggests that some of the Report’s content was inspired by people 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an all-European free trade area”, see Kreinen, Mordechai E. (1960), “The ‘Outer Seven’ and European Integration”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 370-386. 
28 The effective abandonment of a European free trade arrangement was underlined further by the likes of Rey in 1960. 
See his comments in Rey (1960), pp. 436-437. Rey also argues (p. 441) that a European economic association could not 
be created until after the EEC had introduced its common external tariff and was conducting a common trade policy. 
However, in line with the emphasis being placed on pursuing a more global approach to the issue of free trade in 
Europe, Rey did not exclude for ever (p. 438) the possibility of an association between the EEC and its European and 
Atlantic partners. 
29 Camps (1960), p. 24; Lindberg (1963), pp. 156-160; Camps (1964), pp. 199-202. 
30 The prospects for an OEEC-wide free trade arrangement were also being reduced by the different perceptions of the 
form such might take. Whereas the Six spoke in terms of a “multilateral association” with the EEC at its centre, 
politicians in the Seven (in particular, the United Kingdom), showed a clear preference for a “multilateral solution” 
whereby the EEC and the Seven would be equal partners in a new Europe-wide agreement. See Jesserich (1963), pp. 
47-48 and pp. 106-109.  
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working in the Commission and the Report reflected ‘almost uncannily’ some of the known ideas of 
Hallstein. 
 
The report acknowledged the potentially far-reaching and wide-ranging nature of association, but 
favoured membership as the norm for European countries (ibid: point 84-5). Association with those 
countries unable or unwilling to become members, it was argued, contained various dangers. In 
creating various associations, the EEC would run the risk of undermining its capacity to survive and 
develop (ibid: point 93). It was assumed that applicants sought association essentially for reasons of 
economic self-interest and without appreciating the political implications of such a relationship. 
Given its predominantly political character, it was not possible for the Community to enter into an 
association unless the country concerned not only accepted, but also contributed towards the EEC’s 
political goals. Hence, trade issues should be dealt with in GATT. Where an applicant wished to 
establish an association covering issues beyond trade, such an arrangement would have to contain a 
balance of benefits and obligations. However, given that the member states had given up certain 
rights in order to receive the benefits of membership, it would be inappropriate to grant similar 
benefits to associates unless they were willing to make concessions themselves. Consequently, the 
idea that potential associates could pick and choose what they wished from the Community menu 
was unacceptable (ibid: points 89-91).31 At the core of any association would be trade relations. 
However, the report expressed considerable caution over whether free trade could be established 
since this would cause problems for the EEC, particularly concerning rules of origin. Moreover, as 
had been argued at the time of the Maudling negotiations, a free trade area would provide non-
member states with many of the advantages of membership without the same states having to 
assume any of the obligations or burdens of membership(ibid: 106-107). So, any association would 
have to be based on a customs union as a minimum. In fact it should not only involve the adoption 
of the CET but also cover other policy areas, specifically competition policy and fundamental 
elements of economic union. Moreover, an association would clearly be dynamic and lead to 
economic convergence between the EEC and the associate. It would thus be ideal for those wishing 
ultimately to become members (ibid: points 100-103). Moreover, in order to maintain uniformity 
and discipline, it was pointed out that associates would most likely have to abide by EEC decisions 
although they would not be granted an equal say in the Community’s decision-making processes 
(ibid: point 105). Nevertheless, an institutional framework, including parliamentary contacts would 
be necessary.32 
 
For states seeking association in the 1960s the Birkelbach Report adopted a very narrow and 
unaccommodating perspective on association. A balance of rights and extensive obligations was 
envisaged; and in exchange there would be little on offer institutionally. Special procedures mean 
just that – special procedures – and no access to the EEC’s institutions or decision-making 
procedures. As for the common action, the associate would be acting alongside the EEC. From an 
EEC perspective, however, Birkelbach’s conclusions were justified. The EEC was still in its formative 
years and so association should be avoided since it could water down the Community’s political 
vocation. Hence, although many in the Commission and the EP were not opposed to association per 
se, they were reluctant to enter into any arrangements which might retard or even threaten the 
EEC’s development.33  
 
The Blaisse Report 
 
                                                          
31 This idea is occasionally referred to as the “raisins theory” from the German phrase “sich die Rosinen aus dem Kuchen 
picken” (to pick the raisins from the cake). 
32 The report also noted (points 120-1) that the Community could face logistical problems with regard to institutions if a 
large number of associations were established.  
33 Neunreither (1964), pp. 50-51. 
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In contrast to Birkelbach’s essentially restrictive approach, a second EP report, this time from its 
Committee on External Trade, appeared more accommodating. The 1963 Blaisse report, while only 
devoting minimal space to the issue, noted that association was possible 
for countries which, though unable or disinclined to join the Community, are nevertheless 
prepared to play their part in the integration process by harmonising their economy with 
that of the Community to a really appreciable extent.34 
 
Hence, the report argued in favour of opening negotiations with the neutral countries which had 
applied in 1961 (4.2.1). However, with regard to the content of an association, the report echoed the 
Commission memoranda in stressing that the minimum should be a customs union with common 
policies in some areas. With regard to the Birkelbach report, Blaisse wholeheartedly endorsed its 
conclusions regarding the political and institutional aspects of association.35 A consensus on 
association, at least among EEC institutions, was emerging. 
 
The Interlaken Principles 
 
The prevailing consensus post-Birkelbach that …. was never formally been recorded. Nor has it been 
recorded since. However, it was evident in the arrangements for association contained in the first 
association agreements that the EEC concluded with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963). 
 
The spirit of Birkelbach was also in evidence when the European Community and the then seven 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) began to upgrade their relations in the 
1980s. A Commission communication on implementing the Joint [Luxembourg] Declaration agreed 
by EC and EFTA ministers on 9 April 1984 identified four principles that should be observed in the 
development of relations: 
 
a) Community integration and … [the Community’s] independent power of decision must 
under no circumstances be affected. 
b) The elimination of technical barriers to trade and the simplification of administrative 
formalities at Community-EFTA frontiers are a logical extension of the Free Trade 
Agreements and should be pursued parallel to the progressive integration of the 
Community's internal market. 
c) No specific field should be excluded a priori for cooperation. The Community must, for 
example, also step up coordination with EFTA countries in fields such as transport or 
environmental policy, which of their nature cannot be limited by frontiers and are also 
issues of great concern to ordinary people. 
d) It will only be possible to progress towards achievement of a wider European market if the 
costs and benefits involved are shared equally. Measures taken in parallel must involve real 
reciprocity’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1985: point 5). 
 
The first and last of these would soon feature in the – often forgotten – Interlaken principles that the 
Commissioner for External Relations, Willy de Clercq, set out in a meeting in Interlaken of ministers 
from EC and EFTA member states on 20 May 1987. As far as the Commission was concerned, the 
development of EC-EFTA relations – a process that would ultimately lead to the establishment on 1 
January 1994 of the European Economic Area (EEA) – would be governed by three principles: 
 
                                                          
34 Blaisse, P.A. (Rapporteur) (1963), “Report on behalf of the Committee on External Trade on the common trade policy of 
the EEC towards third countries and on the applications by European countries for membership or association”, 
European Parliament Working Papers, No. 134, 26 January, point 35. 
35 Blaisse (Rapporteur) (1963), points 44-45. 
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 priority for the EC’s own internal integration 
 the safeguarding of full decision-making autonomy for the EC  
 a balance of benefits and obligations would be maintained (Agence Europe, 1987)  
 
None of the principles would have caused any surprise among EFTA member states. According to a 
senior Commission official, the EC in its relations with the EFTA countries had for a long time been 
consistent in its insistence on respect for its autonomy (Hayes, 2011: 22). According to a Finnish 
official: ‘anything else “would have been rather odd”’ (Kuosmanen, 2001:7).   
 
The third Interlaken Principle – of reciprocity and a balance between rights and obligations – was 
well-known too, not least from the provisions on association contained in Article 238 TEC. 
Consequently there appeared to be no notable opposition within the EC to the principles being 
adopted. As much was made clear by the member states when the General Affairs Council on 20 July 
1987 endorsed the principle by recording ‘its full support to the guidelines for future co-operation 
agreed on at the Interlaken meeting between the Commission and EFTA Ministers (May 1987) and to 
the principles on which co-operation between the Community and EFTA were based’ (Council of the 
European Communities – General Secretariat, 1987: 7). 
 
Although subsequently, Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, referred in a speech to the EP 
in January 1989 to the possibility of ‘more structured [EC-EFTA] partnership with common decision-
making and administrative institutions’, thereby suggesting that the EC was willing to compromise 
on its decision-making autonomy, the Commission’s language quickly shifted to ‘decision-shaping’. 
Delors reference to ‘decision-making’ was inadvertent. Moreover, as exploratory talks soon 
revealed, it was clear that the EC was never going to accept the EFTA desire for ‘genuine common 
decision-making mechanism’ whereby the membership of relevant EC decision-making bodies would 
be increased from 12 to 19 delegates the purpose of adopting decisions relating to the EEA. The EC 
was, according to EP researchers, ‘adamant that its decision-making autonomy must not be 
compromised … [its] insistence on the principle of autonomous internal decision-making excluded 
any form of intervention by non-member states outside the Community structure’ (European 
Parliament Directorate-General for Research, 1993: 12).  
 
It could have surprised few, therefore, that the ECJ in its opinion (Opinion 1/91) on the initial version 
of the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area, upheld the institutional autonomy of 
the EC by objecting to the structure and competences of a the proposed EEA Court comprising ECJ 
and EFTA judges. Its argument was that the legally binding interpretations of an EEA Court could 
adversely affect the autonomy and exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ. Consequently it ruled that the 
‘system of judicial supervision which the agreement proposes to set up is incompatible with the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community’ (Opinion 1/91: _). Revisions to the EEA 
Agreement were duly negotiated, the outcome of which was that the EEA court was abandoned in 
favour of de facto ECJ jurisdiction over the EEA. 
 
In line with the principle of the safeguarding the full decision-making autonomy for the EC, no 
provision was made for judges from the EFTA states to sit on the ECJ for matters concerning the EEA. 
Nor did the EEA Agreement provide, despite the obligation to take on future legislation to ensure 
the homogeneity of the EEA, for any direct participation of officials, ministers or parliamentarians 
from the EFTA states in the activities of the Commission, Council or Parliament. Instead, officials 
from the EFTA states would be involved in a consultative decision-shaping mechanism.  
 
See Gould (2008) on limitations … 
 
The insistence of the EC – now EU – on upholding the principles set out at Interlaken was also 
evident in the new associations being created thorough the Europe Agreements with the countries 
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of Central and Eastern Europe. Following the precedents set by earlier bilateral association 
agreements, for example those with Greece and Turkey, these involved  … 
 
The Europe Agreements understandably attracted criticism, not least because they failed to offer the 
clear membership perspective that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe desired. They also 
failed to create a sense of involvement in the mainstream process of post-Cold War European 
integration. The EU was failing to facilitate the countries’ ‘return to Europe’. Such shortcomings were 
eventually addressed in through decisions of the European Council at Copenhagen in June 1993.It 
not only issued a commitment to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – ‘the 
associated countries in Central and Eastern European  Europe that so desire shall become members 
of the European Union’ – it also launched a novel ‘structured relationship’ with these countries that 
would involve a ‘reinforced and extended multilateral dialogue’ conducted through advisory 
meetings between the Council and the countries concerned on matters of common interest, 
including those with ‘a trans-European dimension, including energy, environment, transport, science 
and technology’ the common foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs (Conclusions 
of the Presidency, 1993: 7.A.iii and Annex II). This structured multilateral dialogue – which was 
sustained until 1997 – was unprecedented; no non-member state or group of non-member states 
had previously been offered the opportunity to attend regular formal dialogue meetings with 
members of the Council. Dialogue was generally restricted to bilateral association bodies, such as 
Association Committees, Association Councils and Parliamentary Association Committees. 
 
New Forms of Membership 
 
Of the new forms of membership mentioned, the first to be proposed was ‘affiliate membership’ in 
1991. The idea is associated with Frans Andriessen, then Commissioner for External Relations, and 
was aimed at the ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe and ‘long-standing partners’ of 
the EC (Andriessen, 1991a). The novelty of proposed arrangement was it would provide affiliate 
members with ‘a seat at the Council table on a par with full members in specified areas, together 
with appropriate representation in other institutions, such as the Parliament’.  Furthermore, 
Andriessen envisaged affiliate members taking part ‘fully’ in foreign policy decisions coming within 
the Community sphere and having ‘a link with the European Monetary System and with the 
progressive stages through which economic and monetary union is to be achieved’.36 Moreover, 
affiliate membership could be extended to EC activities in diverse areas, such as ‘transport, energy, 
the environment, research and development’ with the precise coverage ‘to be agreed on a case by 
case basis’. The outcome would be that each country could pursue integration ‘according to its 
capacities and needs’. 
 
A few weeks after launching the idea of affiliate membership, Andriessen offered some further 
clarification of what it might entail (Andriessen, 1991b). Affiliate membership would be a ‘special 
kind of membership’ enabling countries concerned ‘to contribute to policy formulation in areas 
considered to be common European interests’. This could involve the consultation of affiliate 
members  through ‘enlarged sessions’ of the Council and the EP. The range of issues now included 
telecommunications, environmental standards, and Europe’s ‘common cultural heritage’. Andriessen 
also suggested that affiliate members could peg their exchange rate to the ECU thus ‘giving rise to 
new forms of cooperation’.  
 
Andriessen’s idea of affiliate membership – which he also referred to as associate membership (see 
Andriessen, 1991b) – failed to attract support, not least because many EC officials viewed the idea as 
                                                          
36  On participation in foreign policy decisions, Andriessen did acknowledge that neutrality might arise as a problem in the 
context of security-related decisions. He responded that ‘this question already exists in the Community of Twelve and a 
flexible formula could allow for occasional opting out’. 
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unworkable and the governments of the countries of Central and East Europe viewed it as an 
unacceptable offer of ‘second-class’ membership (Smith, 2005: 761). Undoubtedly some of those 
with misgivings about the idea would have been concerned at how, if implemented, it would 
seriously question the sanctity of principle that the full decision-making autonomy for the EC  be 
safeguarded 
 
EEA-plus 
 
 
Partial Membership 
 
According to Emmanouilidis (2008: 11-12), 
‘Partial Membership transcends both the association 
and the classical enlargement paradigm. In the 
framework of Partial Membership affiliated countries 
are not merely associated but rather integrated in 
one or more specific EU policy areas without 
however becoming full members of the European 
Union. Sectoral integration can relate to political 
(e.g., CFSP/CSDP, Schengen25, visa regime) and/or 
economic aspects (e.g., internal market, energy and 
climate policy, euro). It can involve policy areas, 
which include all EU countries, or areas, which are 
subject to a high level of differentiation among 
member states. “Partial” members become de facto 
members in the respective field and as such fulfil 
similar obligations and enjoy similar rights as any 
other EU country. Accordingly, “partial” members 
would be obliged to contribute to the policy-relevant 
budget and at the same time enjoy partial access to 
the Union’s core institutions. Over time, Partial 
Membership can be extended to other policy areas 
and would not exclude the possibility of an eventual 
full membership in the EU.’  
 
 
From the perspective of a country aspiring to join the 
EU, the concept of Partial Membership 
offers one great advantage: Contrary to an 
Association Plus, “partial” members take part in or 
at least have the ability to (strongly) influence the 
Union’s decision-making process from the 
inside. Countries participating in a certain policy field take part in deliberations and have a 
strong involvement and say regarding issues related to the respective (sub-)policy field. 
 
“Partial” members are not degraded to mere recipients of the EU’s acquis, but are able to 
actively and directly co-determine the EU’s political and legal decisions from within the 
Union’s 
institutional architecture. Sectoral members are thus attributed a substantive dimension of 
EU 
membership, which was hitherto reserved to full EU members. 
Representatives of ”partial” members would take part in the ordinary meetings of the 
relevant 
EU institutions and bodies. In more concrete terms, the participation of “partial” members in 
Draft Article 50 TEU 
1. Any Member State which 
continues to respect the values 
referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may 
notify the European Council of its 
intention to become an associate 
member of the Union. The 
negotiations shall be conducted by 
the Commission on the basis of a 
mandate agreed by the Council, 
after consulting the Parliament. 
2. The conditions of associate 
membership and the adjustments 
to the Treaties on which the Union 
is founded shall be the subject of 
an agreement between the 
Member States and the Associate 
Member State. The agreement 
shall be concluded on behalf of the 
Union by the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, after consulting 
the Commission and after 
obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament. The 
agreement will enter into force 
once it has been approved by the 
Member States and the Associate 
Member State in accordance with 
their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
(Duff, 2012: 68-9) 
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the three main EU organs – (European) Council, European Parliament, European 
Commission 
– could be organized as follows: 
 
(European) Council: Representatives of the “partial” members take part in European 
Council summits and in the meetings of the various formations of the Council and its 
substructures (working groups and committees, COREPER, PSC etc.) – when decisions 
relevant to the respective policy area(s) are deliberated. The representatives of “partial” 
members would have at least the right to express their point of views. Beyond this 
undeniable right to put forward a national position, one would have to clarify, whether the 
“partial” members have no voting right, some sort of veto or suspensive veto, or even 
equal voting rights when decisions in the respective (sub-)policy field are taken. The 
participation rights of the “partial” members must not be uniform, but could rather vary from 
policy area to policy area. 
• European Parliament: Parliamentarians of the “partial” members participate in the 
deliberations of the European Parliament when issues related to the specific (sub-)policy 
area are debated and relevant decisions are taken. Commensurate to full EU members, 
the number of parliamentarians would be determined in a degressively proportional 
relation to the population size of the “partial” member. The representatives of the “partial” 
members could either be seconded national parliamentarians or “European 
parliamentarians” elected in a separate election. Again, one would have to resolve 
whether the representatives of the “partial” members would be limited to an active 
observer status, which would assign them the right to express an opinion but exclude the 
right to participate in a vote, or whether they would enjoy similar or even equal rights as 
the “ordinary members” of the European Parliament.30 
• European Commission: Based on the institutional logic of the European Union, one could 
argue that it is not obligatory that the “partial” members are represented in the 
Commission. Two arguments justify this position: (i) The Commission is a supranational 
organ called to be “completely independent” and to “promote the general interest of the 
Union” and not the interest of any particular member state(s). Commissioners should not 
first and foremost be national representatives, but rather members of a supranational 
college, who “shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government”. (ii) Following 
the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and as from November 1, 2014, the number of 
Commissioners will be smaller than the number of member states. As a consequence, even 
full EU members will not always have the right to nominate one of their nationals to 
become member of the European Commission. The “partial” members will thus not be the 
only ones, who are not “represented” in the Brussels college. 
Concerning participation in the EU’s bureaucratic structures, “partial” members could be 
represented in the relevant administrative services of the Commission (i.e. the relevant 
Directorates-General), the General Secretariat of the Council, the administration of the 
European Parliament, the new “European External Action Service”, or in all relevant EU 
agencies. 
The institutional details of a Partial Membership would have to be codified in writing. Two 
options seem feasible: (1) The EU and the “partial” member conclude, sign and ratify a 
bilateral agreement/treaty laying down the specific institutional details of their partnership. (2) 
The terms of Partial Membership – including the overall institutional set-up – are generally 
defined and legally codified in the EU Treaties. The latter would require a revision of the 
Union’s primary law on the grounds of the ordinary revision procedure.31 
 
Limited Membership 
 
(3) Limited Membership 
The concept of Limited Membership follows the logic of the enlargement paradigm. But the 
acceding state becomes an EU member subject to certain limitations. The new EU country 
does not enjoy all benefits of membership as it is excluded from certain (key) policy areas 
(e.g., Schengen, ESDP/CSDP, “four freedoms”, euro) or is not obliged to apply certain legal 
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norms (e.g., differentiated acquis via enhanced cooperation, opt-out). In the past, the EU 
and 
the acceding countries agreed that new members must from day one of their accession 
respect the Union’s acquis and fulfil all obligations deriving from EU membership. In other 
words, European law was valid right from the beginning although its application was in 
certain 
cases temporarily delayed, due to either derogations laid down in the accession treaty (e.g., 
transition period concerning the free access of labour markets), or due to the fact that the 
new 
EU countries were not (yet) able to fulfil certain pre-defined participation criteria or 
obligations 
(e.g., late introduction of the euro, no immediate abolition of border controls). 
The notion of Limited Membership deviates from this rule as new member states are more 
permanently excluded from one or more (sub-)policy areas or parts of the EU’s acquis, if 
both 
parties – the Union and the acceding country – agree to the respective exemption in the 
course of membership negotiations. Beyond such selective exceptions, the new member 
states would enjoy all legal rights and obligations deriving from EU membership. 
Institutionally, 
the new EU country would be fully and equally represented in every EU institution. However, 
in 
the affected (sub-)policy fields “limited” members might not enjoy the same institutional rights 
as EU countries not subject to any membership limitations (e.g., no participation in the 
Eurogroup; no voting rights in certain forms of enhanced cooperation). 
The exclusion of new member states from certain parts of the acquis can alleviate and 
speed up the accession of new member states. Such exemptions can 
make it politically easier for certain countries to join the EU by removing national obstacles 
on the road to EU membership (e.g., potential opt-out of Switzerland concerning 
ESDP/CSDP or tax harmonisation); 
• allow a more rapid integration of states which otherwise would not (yet) fulfil all 
prerequisites for joining the Union; 
• reduce certain reservations in the “old” member states towards the accession of a certain 
country to the EU by e.g., restricting the acceding country’s access to the EU labour 
market or to structural or agricultural funds. The current Turkish case leads in this direction: 
The EU’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey includes the possibility to negotiate long-term 
derogations. It explicitly mentions “permanent safeguard clauses i.e. clauses which are 
permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures” in areas such as the free 
movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture.3 
The introduction of Limited Membership would lead to new sub-forms of membership and 
citizenship. The “limited” members would not enjoy the same rights and privileges as older 
EU 
countries and their citizens. One could argue that such forms of “second-class” membership 
or 
citizenship are nothing new. Some of the older EU members such as Denmark and the UK 
concerning the euro, Denmark, Ireland and the UK concerning Schengen, Denmark in the 
defence field of ESDP/CSDP or the UK and Poland concerning the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights are also not (fully) applying all parts of the EU’s acquis. However, there are two 
important differences between both cases: First, Denmark, Ireland, Poland or the UK had 
themselves decided to restrict their membership status. Second, they had been able to 
codetermine 
the specific conditions of their partial exemption as they were already in the strong 
position of a full-fledged member of the EC/EU. In contrast, the acceding countries would in 
most cases become “limited” members not on their own will, but rather due to the pressure 
from older member states. Most “limited” members would have to accept the limitations to 
their 
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membership, if they want to gain accession to the club. 
The notion of being a second-class member can lead to severe tensions between old and 
new EU countries, if over time the latter feel discriminated by the former. The notion of being 
discriminated can fuel anti-EU sentiments in the new member states and put pressure on the 
ruling political class to improve their countries’ membership status in the Union. As a result, 
“limited” members could compel fellow EU members to remove the remaining membership 
restrictions. The ability of the “discriminated“ new EU countries to exert pressure on the older 
member states will depend on their power position within the Union. As “limited” members 
would be fully integrated into the EU’s institutional framework, they would be able to exert 
strong pressure on their partners. In case both sides clash, the resulting rupture between old 
and new EU members could negatively affect the Union’s internal and external ability to act 
and even impede the EU’s structural development. 
As a consequence, the concept of Limited Membership makes sense only, if it is conceived 
and construed as an intermediate step towards a full-fledged unlimited membership. 
Exemptions from certain (sub-)policy areas or from parts of the acquis should not be eternal. 
The accession treaty should include predefined mechanisms and procedures allowing for the 
abatement of certain membership limitations. The eradication of restrictions should be 
subject 
to a decision of the Council taken by qualified majority and not by consensus. No single EU 
member or small number of states should be able to veto the gradual inclusion of a new 
member state in all policy areas. 
 
 
As emmXX argues: 
 
‘Increased differentiation among EU members will increase the likelihood that 
alternative forms of membership might be implemented in practice. 
If the degree of differentiation within the EU increases one will witness more flexible forms 
of membership. The Union has already entered that path as some EU countries are 
excluded from core policy areas such as Schengen, the third stage of EMU, or the military 
aspects of ESDP/CSDP. In case differentiation among EU members becomes more 
intense, the boundaries between full membership, Limited Membership, Partial 
Membership or Association Plus will become increasingly diffuse. And the more 
differentiated the EU becomes, the higher the chances that neighbouring countries might 
be affiliated beneath the level of full membership. Here some reasons or scenarios which 
support this argument: 
• Increased acceptance of membership minus: Increased differentiation among EU 
countries will make it less problematic for affiliated countries to accept a status below 
full membership. New EU members will be more ready to accept limitations to their 
membership status, as old EU members do also not participate in all policy areas on an 
equal basis. 
• Introduction of Partial Membership following voluntary withdrawal:33 Following a 
voluntary withdrawal of an EU country, Partial Membership might offer both sides a way 
how to re-organize the relationship between the former EU member and the Union. As 
a mater of fact, the perspective of Partial Membership might even make it easier for a 
country to exit the Union as it offers the possibility to remain closely affiliated with the 
Union. If Partial Membership is introduced into EU practice, it might offer a viable way 
for affiliating neighbouring countries beyond a mere association. 
• Limited Membership as differentiated acquis not binding for new members: The 
perspectives for Limited Membership would increase if a group of EU members 
deepens its level of cooperation and acceding states are not obliged to implement this 
“differentiated acquis”. The differentiation instrument of enhanced cooperation provides 
a concrete example: In case a group of EU members decides to apply the instrument of 
enhanced cooperation, the level of differentiation between new and old EU members 
might increase substantially. This has to do with the fact that acts and decisions 
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adopted in the framework of an enhanced cooperation do not form part of the EU’s 
overall acquis which “has to be accepted by candidate states for accession to the 
Union” (Art. 44.1. TEU-N; Art. 20.4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)). New members would thus join the Union without implementing the 
“differentiated acquis” adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation. Past 
experience has shown that differentiation within the EU increases the chances that new 
member states do not participate in certain policies (e.g., introduction of euro, abolition 
of border controls within Schengen) – at least not immediately after EU accession. 
 
In 2012 suggestions were being made that partial membership be offered to Turkey instead 
of the underdeveloped ‘privileged partnership’ to which Turkey had long been voicing 
opposition. Critics rightly maintained that the existing EU-Turkey relationship already 
amounted to partial membership, given the levels of integration involved in the customs 
union (see Yurttagül, 2012). Moreover, the concept of partial membership could just as 
easily be applied to certain members outside the eurozone and Schengen.  
 
Associate Membership 
 
More recently, the notion of associate membership has been revived. At the urging of Andrew Duff 
MEP, the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs in September 2012 in its latest report 
on enlargement recommended that ‘at the next general revision of the Treaties … [it] should initiate 
a discussion on the introduction of a new category of associate membership of the Union’ (European 
Parliament, 2012a: 38).37 According to Duff, a new Article 49a TEU should be drafted to sit alongside 
the existing provisions for accession to (Article 49 TEU) and withdrawal from (Article 50 TEU) the 
EU.38 Although motivated by various enlargement-related desires – e.g. to provide an interim form 
of membership to the likes of states seeking to join the EU for states, or an upgrade to those intent 
on remaining outside the EU – Duff argues that ‘associate membership’ could be offered to the 
United Kingdom as it seeks to loosen its ties with the EU (Duff, 2013a). 
 
Duff’s proposal of associate membership would require ‘fidelity’ to the EU’s values and principles 
contained in Article 2 TEU as well as to the principle, of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) 
TEU. In terms of policy engagement, conditions would be determined on a ‘case by case basis’, 
depending not least on whether a state was seeking to accede or leaving the EU. However, but 
associate membership would have at its core the EU’s customs union. It would therefore extend 
beyond the ‘free trade area’ framework for the free movement of goods that is a core feature of the 
single market to involve the adoption by the associate member of the EU’s Common External Tariff 
and, by implication, its Common Commercial Policy. More generally on the internal market, 
participation need not be full, but should not risk the internal market’s operation. Participation in 
the EU’s external action and international agreements concluded by the EU would also be open to 
the associate member, although again only in so far as the former’s cohesion and the scope of any 
                                                          
37 Although endorsed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the recommendation did not secure the support of MEPs 
generally and so did not feature in their Resolution of 22 November 2012 on Enlargement: policies, criteria and 
the EU's strategic interests (European Parliament, 2012b) 
38  Duff and others have proposed that the article be drafted by a convention to be called in 2015 following the 2014 EP 
elections. Duff previously proposed the establishment of ‘associate member’ status during the European Convention in 
2002-03. Associate members would be those democratic non-member states to which the EU had extended provisions 
of the constitution of Duff’s proposed Federal Union of Europe (European Convention, 2002). Associate membership 
would also be open to any existing EU member state deciding not to adopt the proposed the draft constitution. It was 
also envisaged that the rights of an associate member could be revoked or reinstated on a proposal of the Commission 
or on an initiative of the Court with the approval of a three-quarters majority of the member states in the Council and 
by an absolute majority of Members of the European Parliament. He made a further call for associate membership in 
advance of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Lisbon. Associate membership could provide a ‘safety valve’ for 
any member state opting to reject the Constitutional Treaty but willing to retain close links with the EU (Duff, 2007).  
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positions it adopted would not be prejudiced. Associate members would also be able to draw on the 
services of the Commission and EU agencies for the delivery of specific policies or parts of them. 
Arrangements would, echoing the TFEU’s existing provisions on association, involve ‘reciprocal rights 
and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly’ (Duff, 2013a)  
 
Duff’s ideas regarding institutional arrangements also have echoes of existing principles 
underpinning associate status in so far as there is no provision for any decision-making role in the 
Council or European Council. However, Duff does envisage observer status being granted for 
government representatives in the Council when the latter’s agenda relates to a policy area in which 
the associate member participates. Government representatives from the associate member would 
also be involved in ‘appropriate’ Council Working Groups. Representatives of the national 
parliament of the associate member would have observer status in the EP; and the associate 
member would enjoy observer status in comitology processes. No observer status would, however, 
be granted in respect of the Commission or the European Council. Instead, associate membership 
would entail inclusion in the ‘relevant’ consultation processes of the Commission’ and participation 
in an annual multilateral meeting of the European Council and the heads of state or of government 
of associate members. In exchange for ‘acknowledging’ the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (ECJ), 
the associate member would, however, be able to nominate a judge in the same way as a member 
state. The associate member would also be able to intervene in cases before the ECJ and institute 
third-party proceedings where a judgement has been prejudicial their rights (Duff, 2013a). 
 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the attraction of associate membership is that it provides an 
alternative to withdrawal that can accommodate a UK desire to remove itself from certain aspects of 
EU integration. As Duff comments, it would be based ‘essentially on those aspects of the single 
market which the British find palatable and its erstwhile partners tolerable’ (Duff, 2012: 55). A 
further attraction for Duff of the proposed associate membership is that it could also prevent a UK 
veto of the EU’s constitutional evolution (Duff, 2012). And establishing associate membership status 
need not wait for an amendment to the TEU; it could be negotiated as the post-withdrawal 
settlement envisaged in Article 50 TEU.  
 
Gstöhl (1994) observed at the time, that Opinion 1/91 may play a role whenever the ECJ assesses the 
need to safeguard the autonomy of the Community legal order with regard to international 
agreements. It can equally be assumed that a similar line of argument would be adopted if any form 
of associate membership [EXPAND AND MOVE TO LATER DISCUSSION] 
 
However, as press reaction to Duffs’ proposals was quick to point out, as an associate member, the 
United Kingdom would become in effect a ‘second-class’ member, lose its veto over policy 
developments, including those affect the United Kingdom, and forge MEPs (Daily Mail, 2013).  
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